UA 
How can Ukraine turn its wartime experience into a strategic advantage rather than hand it over to the world without any political or economic return? Ukraine Facility Platform’s approach is to build resilient defence alliances with European countries that feel the threat most acutely and want to factor Ukrainian experience into their military doctrines. The concept was presented by Olga Khoroshylova, Sectoral leader for Defence at UAFP, during UAFP Live with Iryna Prokofieva.
Regional alliances. The essence of Ukraine Facility Platform’s approach
The idea behind Ukraine Facility Platform is to build a partnership hub with one European country first and then scale this approach in relations with other interested states.
Ukraine has, by necessity, updated its view of how the link between arms manufacturers and the Ministry of Defence works, and it is ready to share practical lessons learned. At the same time, Ukraine’s defence cooperation with European countries has so far largely been based on receiving assistance and has not led to the systematic integration of Ukrainian experience into the European security system. That is why Ukraine Facility Platform proposes building a new model of cooperation with partner countries at several levels:
- Military partnership. This should be a legally formalised arrangement that would allow Ukrainian service personnel to share the lessons of war they have learned and advise partners on how these lessons could be applied in their own military doctrines. In particular, cooperation at brigade level should be systematised in order to create conditions for information exchange in a way that also enables Ukrainian service personnel to receive feedback from the cooperation.
- Cooperation between Ministries of Defence, in order to guide and coordinate procurement and the planning of further development.
- A fundamentally new connection with manufacturers. The ability to communicate quickly between military end users and arms manufacturers should be accelerated so that products can be promptly adjusted on request. For example, in Ukraine, a representative of a manufacturing company can work alongside military end users to refine a product. This is a highly unusual model of cooperation for NATO countries.
Latvia is the first country on NATO’s eastern flank with which UAFP plans to develop this new model of defence cooperation. It is one of the countries that clearly understands the threat posed by Russia. With that in mind, it will be easier to reach agreement with Latvia on implementing projects like Build with Ukraine or Build in Ukraine, Olga Khoroshylova believes.
A successful pilot case of cooperation will be easier to scale in relations with other countries.
Know-how. What makes Ukrainian experience valuable
The real value lies not in the weaponry itself, but in the approaches: the improvement cycle, the speed of response, and the connection between the manufacturer, the military, and the battlefield situation. Yet few people know that the Merops drones developed by an American company have, since 2023, been tested and refined with access to Ukrainian military personnel and feedback from the battlefield.
By contrast, a positive example is the joint production of the Octopus drone with the British. The UK recently said it was discussing with the Ukrainian side the possibility of selling these drones to the Middle East. The advantage is that production is based on intergovernmental and inter-agency agreements. Ukraine has retained the right to manufacture the product on its own territory, increased production volumes with the help of capacity in Britain, diversified risks, and strengthened its defence capability. This example should also be applied in cooperation with other countries.
The broader question of strategy
A country’s defence capability must be built on strategy. The key challenge for everyone developing a new strategy is how to account for uncertainty and build in the capacity for rapid change in response to the dynamic situation on the battlefield.
At the same time, even modern warfare requires a complete rethink of the approaches European generals have grown used to. European countries are trying to review their procurement systems in order to move away from 10–15-year planning cycles. Otherwise, artillery or drones come off the production line already obsolete. For example, one European large-drone production programme with a budget of €6–8 billion has not yet reached the first testing stage.
Large-scale joint European projects are running into the same problems: the parties have different views of implementation and are not ready to compromise. For example, France, Germany and Spain have been unable to reach agreement on the Future Combat Air System project, because France has nuclear weapons and wants the new aircraft to be capable of carrying them, while Germany is not prepared to spend money on that. In essence, the countries are arguing over what the new aircraft should be, who will create the jobs, and who will take the lead in the project. Yet none of them is thinking strategically about how to build a new aircraft that would meet the demands of modern aerial warfare and secure European air dominance.
A turning point: will Ukraine seize the opportunity?
Ukraine should make use of the global security situation and the gains accumulated over four years of war in order to cement its position in the European and transatlantic security architecture. Joining forces with European partners to assist the Gulf states could become a step in this direction.
