UA 
Extreme cold and Russia’s “freeze-out” tactics have once again pushed Ukraine’s million-plus cities to the brink. Kyiv, Kharkiv, Odesa, and Dnipro are facing a critical situation: no electricity, no water, no heating.
In the latest episode of UAFP Live with Roman Vybranovskyy, co-founder of the Ukraine Facility Platform, the conversation focused not only on the consequences of the strikes, but also on the governance failures that made this winter so painful. Why “everything will be fine” became a fatal self-deception, what happened to international assistance, and what the real rescue plan for communities looks like – the key points are compiled below.
Self-deception instead of preparedness: the main mistake of this winter
The biggest mistake was not even the cold or the fact of Russian attacks, but the way society was complacent, lulled by conflicting forecasts. On the one hand, people were told: “this will be the hardest winter.” On the other: “but if there are no strikes, we’ll get through it.” That leads to a simple question: why would there be no strikes? Who said there would be none? What indicated that?
The country did not do systematic work to learn from mistakes. There must be an honest assessment of who failed to warn, who created the illusion of stability, and who did not do the necessary “homework.” This is not about finding someone to blame – it is about ensuring that next time, we don’t place trust in those who have already been wrong.
A reputation-based accountability mechanism is needed: look at what people said earlier and draw conclusions so the same mistakes are not repeated.
“Headquarters schizophrenia”: lots of meetings do not mean decisions
The government likes to create new task forces, convene meetings, and announce “new solutions,” but in practice it often looks like reshuffling the same people. It is “headquarters schizophrenia.”
If you look at the composition of these “new task forces,” they often include the same officials who were responsible for the sector before – simply in different roles. It is easy to swap people around and claim they are new. That is not true.
The problem is not a lack of governance structures. The problem is that these structures fail to deliver the basics: backup generation and backup power supply for critical infrastructure. When water or heat disappears after strikes, it means “preparedness for any scenario” existed only in statements.
Where did the international assistance go?
Donor assistance has not disappeared. International support has been – and remains – enormous: generators, mobile power units, loans, and equipment for grid restoration.
The core issue is how effectively it is used. What relates to repairs and restoration generally works well. What relates to building something new works poorly. Much of the equipment provided to communities has simply not been connected.
In some cases, equipment is sitting unused in cities (including Kyiv). This has to be acknowledged honestly and turned into conclusions: connect equipment not “everywhere,” but where it will be most effective – and not for one month, but with a multi-year horizon.
Is a complete collapse of the power system possible?
A scenario in which the power system “disappears completely” is unrealistic. Ukraine is in a brutal war of endurance with Russia: they strike – Ukraine repairs. Energy workers keep restoring the system, even when Russia attacks again, sometimes timing repeat strikes for when repair crews arrive on site.
The key question is not “how many strikes the system can withstand,” but how much electricity it can deliver to people after the next attack.
Collapse is possible not as “the end of the system,” but as a situation where a city is temporarily left with minimal supply while substations or networks are being repaired. In that period, it is crucial for a city to have internal backup capacity that allows it to hold out.
Why large facilities are a losing model – and what should replace them
A centralized energy model has become an ideal target for Russia. When the system depends on large CHP plants and major hubs, taking out one key facility can leave entire districts without heating and water.
The solution is to build a large number of mid-scale capacities – 1 to 15 MW – within cities or around them. This does not mean fully covering the total consumption of a megacity. It means ensuring the essentials: water supply, heating, wastewater systems, and the operation of critical infrastructure while the grid is being restored.
Decentralized generation is also a security advantage in wartime: striking many smaller installations is far less efficient than hitting one large facility. There won’t be enough missiles. But the key is that such units must operate not only as emergency backup – they must also work in normal times, because without efficiency the system will not be viable.
Market arrears as a barrier to new generation
Ukraine has an electricity market where prices change hourly. But for the market to function, everyone must settle payments. Instead, some consumers do not pay – including critical infrastructure operators such as water utilities. Sometimes not through their own fault, because their tariffs are lower than their actual electricity costs. In that case, the burden is pushed onto electricity producers.
This creates an environment investors will not enter, because there are no payment guarantees. As a result, arrears become a direct barrier to commissioning new capacity.
Why “waiting it out” failed – and what to do now
Since 2023, the country has lost time due to two factors.
- First, the temptation to “wait it out.” Many thought: if decentralization is a long path to 2027, why start now? At the same time, the illusion persisted: “if there are no strikes, we’ll scrape through.” Ukraine did not.
- Second, the inability of cities and business to reach agreements. Business has learned to work for itself, but has not learned to work both for itself and for the community. Communities, meanwhile, often lack a team that can prepare a project, calculate the economics, and bring in an investor.
There will be no single master plan from the top. Kyiv will not decide what to build and where. Every city and district is unique – communities must shape their own energy models.
A real rescue plan starts with a community clearly calculating and designing what it needs and in what volumes.
Success depends on local leadership and a capable team: a mayor who genuinely cares, and a team that can calculate economic impact and speak to business and donors in the language of projects – not just requests. If this is not done, next winter could repeat the same scenario.
What “European integration” in energy actually means
We like big words: decentralization, European integration. But European integration is not “we passed a law” that will take effect in three years.
If Ukraine wants new generation, new projects, and capital, it is not about slogans. It is about proper electricity market rules, corporate governance, and integration into European markets – the things that truly open the door to capital and technology.
And when someone says “we should wait, because we need to repair CHP plants,” that is manipulation. The people drafting laws and secondary legislation are not standing at a substation with welding equipment. They can and must do their work in parallel.
Don’t wait for “top-down solutions”: what to do at every level now
At the apartment level, people already know the basics (power banks, EcoFlow, essential preparedness). At the building level, residents need to coordinate, set up homeowners’ associations, and install backup power where possible. Comfort depends not on price, but on whether people can agree and act together.
